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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DIVERSITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
AND LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BOARDS
LISSA L. BROOME* AND JOHN M. CONLEY**
ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the organizing question of this symposium—whether
diversifying state medical boards (SMBs) would improve their effectiveness in
disciplining doctors—by drawing on the comparable experiences of corporate
boards of directors and lawyer disciplinary boards. Reexamining our own
qualitative study of corporate board diversity conducted several years ago, we
find that almost of all of the arguments for board diversity raised in the business
literature or our own interviews also tend to support diversity on SMBs.
Reviewing the legal profession’s experience with the diversity question on
lawyer disciplinary boards, we find that many of these arguments have also been
recognized, at least implicitly, by state bars and are embodied in the legal
profession’s initiatives to improve diversity in its disciplinary processes. Based
on these two sources of evidence, our recommendation is that SMBs should
continue and strengthen their efforts to pursue diversity. Specifically, we
recommend that each board publish its demographic diversity targets along with
an annual report on a standard form reporting the board’s diversity compared
to those targets and an explanation whenever a diversity target is not achieved.
Energizing external actors like medical professional associations to support and
advocate for SMB diversity efforts may also be helpful along with considering
how to make SMB service more attractive to potential diverse members.

* Lissa Broome is the Burton Craige Distinguished Professor; Director, Center for Banking and
Finance; and head of the Director Diversity Initiative (DDI) at the University of North Carolina
School of Law. The DDI works to increase the diversity on corporate boards of directors.
** John Conley is the William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina
School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The project that is the subject of this symposium recommends that state
medical boards (SMBs) “[t]o the extent practicable . . . reflect the geographic,
racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of the State.” 1 We offer board diversity
discussions from two different contexts that may help inform this
recommendation. We draw on a qualitative study of corporate board diversity
that we conducted several years ago, as well as our experience in teaching
professional responsibility in law school. First, we briefly recount the reasons
often given for board diversity in corporate and other contexts. Then, we review
the different approaches that have been tried in order to increase diversity on the
boards of directors of for-profit corporations. Next, we discuss diversity efforts
on state lawyer disciplinary boards, which are even more analogous to SMBs
than corporate boards of directors. Finally, we conclude with several
observations from these two contexts that may be helpful in informing medical
board diversity efforts.
II. LESSONS FROM CORPORATE BOARDS
A.

Background: The Value of Diversity on Boards

Many arguments have been advanced in support of increasing diversity on
governing boards. These include a general argument based on fairness—the
“social cause” 2 case—as well as numerous business justifications. The social
cause argument states that diversity is the “right thing to do,” 3 and that board
membership opportunities—like employment opportunities—should be
available to all. 4 This argument has been more widely accepted in other cultures
and has had “limited appeal within the U.S. shareholder welfare-focused
paradigm.” 5
Numerous business justifications have been advanced for increasing
diversity on corporate boards. One justification is based on evidence that
suggests that more board diversity is correlated with better corporate financial
performance—what those in the field often call the business case. 6 Several
1. Elizabeth Pendo et al., Protecting Patients from Physicians Who Inflict Harm: New Legal
Resources for State Medical Boards, 15 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 7, 22 (2022).
2. Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94 IND.
L.J. 145, 149, 159 (2019) (characterizing the “social cause case” for gender diversity).
3. Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 855, 857 (2011).
4. Nili, supra note 2, at 159.
5. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories:
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 763 (2011) [hereinafter Dangerous
Categories].
6. See, e.g., JASON M. THOMAS & MEGAN STARR, GLOBAL INSIGHTS: FROM IMPACT
INVESTING TO INVESTING FOR IMPACT 2, 5 (2020), https://www.carlyle.com/sites/default/files/
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business case studies show a correlation between board diversity and better
financial performance, 7 but there is no hard evidence that greater board diversity
causes better financial performance. 8
There are several other business justification arguments for greater board
diversity. One argument states that diverse board members may help reduce
agency costs by monitoring management to ensure that management is
maximizing the interests of the owner-shareholders. 9 This has also been
discussed under the rubric of improving investor protection. 10 Diverse boards
may possess a higher quantity and quality of information, consider “more varied
alternatives to any given course of action, and generate higher-quality
decisions.” 11 Diverse boards may also be more likely to engage in “robust
dialogue and better decision making,” avoid “groupthink” 12 and, consequently,
realize more effective corporate governance. 13 As one scholar concluded,
2020-02/From%20Impact%20Investing%20to%20Investing%20for%20Impact_022420.pdf
(finding that its portfolio companies with two or more diverse directors had significantly higher
annual earnings over a three-year period than portfolio companies with no diverse directors);
FCLTGLOBAL, THE LONG-TERM HABITS OF A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE CORPORATE BOARD 11 (2019),
https://www.fcltglobal.org/resource/the-long-term-habits-of-a-highly-effective-corporate-board/
(companies with the most diverse boards had a greater return on capital as compared to companies
with the least diverse boards); see also The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, SR 2020-081 Amendment
1, Proposed Rule Change, LISTING CTR. 13 (Feb. 26, 2021), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/
assets/RuleBook/Nasdaq/filings/SR-NASDAQ-2020-081_Amendment_1.pdf [hereinafter Nasdaq
Proposal] (pointing to a number of studies that “identified positive relationships between board
diversity and commonly used financial metrics”).
7. THOMAS & STARR, supra note 6; FCLTGLOBAL, supra note 6; Nasdaq Proposal, supra
note 6.
8. Nili, supra note 2, at 161 (“the business case in its narrowest sense—a positive effect on
accounting measures or stock price—has yet to definitively establish that gender diversity is the
cause of an increase in the bottom line”); Jesse M. Fried, Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm
Investors? 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 579/2021, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3812642 (citing some “rigorous scholarship
. . . [that] suggest[s] that increasing board diversity can actually lead to lower share prices”). But
see Richard W. Painter, Board Diversity: A Response to Professor Fried 35 (Apr. 12, 2021)
(working draft) (on file with Social Science Research Network) (concluding that Professor Fried
“ignores . . . the many conceptual arguments that board diversity increases shareholder value over
the long term”).
9. Renée V. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292, 304–05 (2009) (concluding that female
directors monitor more aggressively than men).
10. Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 29–35 (summarizing studies that find positive
association between gender diverse audit committees and the quality of earnings, financial
reporting, and public disclosure, along with studies showing a positive association with overall
board gender diversity and various investor protections).
11. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 765 (citing research on the value of heterogeneity
in groups).
12. Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 36.
13. Id.
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“heterogeneous groups share conflicting opinions, knowledge, and perspectives
that result in a more thorough consideration of a wide range of interpretations,
alternatives, and consequences.” 14
Greater board diversity may also send important signals of inclusivity to
observers such as employees and customers. 15 Another, somewhat cynical,
justification for increased board diversity is that it may quiet diversity advocates
and remove that distraction from the boardroom. 16
Research in other areas, including studies of multi-member judicial panels,
indicates that panel diversity may be a net positive in judicial decision-making. 17
Indeed, some studies have found differences between the results reached by male
and female judges in similar cases (referred to as “individual effects”) and also
that female judges influence male judges when sitting on a panel of judges (as
often occurs in the appellate setting) when dealing with sex discrimination cases
(“panel effects”). 18
B.

Our Empirical Research on Corporate Boards

Because of the inconclusiveness of the empirical business case research on
the effect of board diversity on corporate performance, 19 we began a qualitative
study of how board diversity affected the operation of boards and the
performance of corporations. 20 We conducted over fifty interviews with
members of corporate boards (diverse and non-diverse) and others who
interacted frequently with boards. 21 Most of our interviews were conducted over
a three-year period beginning in 2008 as the global financial crisis was

14. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1391 (2002).
15. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 762, 764; see also Lissa Lamkin Broome &
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L.
REV. 431, 457 (2008) (discussing signaling in detail) [hereinafter Signaling Through Board
Diversity].
16. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 764.
17. Id. at 767.
18. Id.; Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 389, 400–06 (2010).
19. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
20. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 768; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M.
Conley & Lissa L. Broome, A Difficult Conversation: Corporate Directors on Race and Gender,
PACE INT’L L. REV., Spring 2014, at 13, 14; Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley & Lissa L.
Broome, The Danger of Difference: Tensions in Directors’ Views of Corporate Board Diversity,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 919, 919–20 (2013); Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from the Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049,
1056 (2011); Signaling Through Board Diversity, supra note 15, at 432.
21. Id.
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unfolding. During that period, most corporate boards were not very diverse, with
women or people of color having token representation, at best. 22
Our interview subjects confirmed many of the business justifications
discussed above. Interestingly, the fairness argument, stressing the moral
imperative of ensuring that corporate board diversity reflects that of the
population, was rarely raised, and when it was mentioned, it was often in
conjunction with other, more functional, justifications for diversity. 23 During
these interviews, we heard that the perspectives provided by diverse board
members helps to avoid groupthink, 24 in part by introducing “a diversity of
experiences and sensibilities” that “promotes richer discussions.” 25 A subset of
these functional explanations about the value of diversity noted that women and
men may approach problems and issues differently, as suggested by a book
popular at the time—Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus. 26 This
rationale seemed to rely on the difference in the interpersonal skills of men and
women and their potentially different sensibilities and ways of reasoning. 27
Often, however, after mentioning these purported differences, respondents
backpedaled, implicitly acknowledging that they might be engaged in
stereotyping. 28 Sometimes, when respondents commented on important
contributions of female or racially diverse directors, the focus of the contribution
was not related to their gender or racial diversity, but rather reflected a specific
skill set that the director brought to the table. 29
Some of our respondents confirmed that diverse board members do send a
signal to employees “that the company cares about the interests and welfare of
female and minority employees, and that the organization is one in which
members of these groups can rise to the highest ranks.” 30 Indeed, we observed
that female directors sometimes commented that they had more empathy for
lower-level employees than male directors showed. 31
Other observations about the value of board diversity added to the
theoretical justifications for diversity recounted earlier. One such argument
included the benefits of accessing the heretofore untapped or underutilized talent
pool of diverse board candidates. 32 By overlooking diverse candidates, boards

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra notes 37–41.
Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 799.
Id. at 778–79.
Id. at 777.
JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS passim (1992).
Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 780.
Id. at 781–82.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793–95.
Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 764 & n.3.
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were missing “really talented people.” 33 Another significant claim about board
diversity’s value in our interview study, one that was also outside the theoretical
literature, “involved the recruitment and promotion of managers and succession
planning for the ‘C-suite.’” 34 The presence of diverse board members often led
to discussions of diversity as it related to succession planning in senior executive
ranks. 35 In some cases, having diverse board members also led to increased
scrutiny on retention and promotion of a diverse workforce. 36
During these interviews, however, we heard relatively few meaningful or
detailed examples of the benefits of diversity on corporate boards, outside of the
development of the executive pipeline. We posited that this may have resulted
from the dangerousness of the diversity categories based on gender, race, and
ethnicity:
The argument for diversity requires the assumption that people of diverse
demographic backgrounds really are different in some meaningful way—but
difference is a concept that must be handled with great delicacy. Those who are
not members of traditionally unrepresented groups do not want to be accused of
stereotyping or essentializing by identifying particular unique contributions of
members of those groups; no one wants to say anything like “they are especially
good at that.” Conversely, those who are members of traditionally unrepresented
groups have a vested interest in presenting themselves as not being different: not
as token members of a group, but as individuals who have been selected based
on their own merit. 37

C. Corporate Board Diversity Numbers
Corporate board diversity increased substantially between 2010 (the time of
our board interview study) and 2020, but the representation of women and
people of color on corporate boards still significantly lags behind the
demographics of the population of the United States. In 2020, the percentage of
Fortune 500 board seats held by women was 26.5%, up from 15.7% in 2010, but
far less than the 50% that one would expect. 38 The 2020 percentage of board
seats held by people of color was 17.5%, up from 12.8% in 2010, 39 but far less
than the almost 40% of the U.S. population composed of people of color. 40
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 797–99.
Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 805.
DELOITTE & ALL. FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE BOARD
DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 18 fig.8 (6th ed.
2021).
39. Id.
40. Quick Facts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 2019), https://www.census gov
/quickfacts/fact/table/US/IPE120219 (as of the 2020 Census, 60.1% of the population was White
alone, not Hispanic or Latino).
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Moreover, the boards of smaller companies outside of the Fortune 500 tend to
be even less diverse. 41 Corporate boards, even after the progress made in the last
decade, do not represent the gender, racial, or ethnic make-up of the United
States population. As a result, numerous approaches have been introduced to
attempt to increase corporate board diversity, with perhaps lessons for increasing
diversity on state medical boards (SMBs).
D. Approaches to Improving Corporate Board Diversity
Many of the approaches to increasing corporate board diversity described
below have been put in place relatively recently, and it may be too soon to fully
assess their efficacy. Efforts to increase board gender diversity were kickstarted
by a 2006 Norwegian statute mandating at least forty percent representation of
both men and women on Norwegian corporate boards. 42 Attention to racial and
ethnic diversity has increased more recently, as evidenced by a 2020 California
state statute 43 and a 2021 rule by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) adopting Nasdaq’s proposal that all companies listed on the Nasdaq have
at least two diverse directors or explain why they do not. 44
As described below, a variety of approaches have been used to try to increase
corporate board diversity, including mandates, targets (often coupled with a
“comply or explain” requirement), disclosure, explanation of how diversity
factors into the director nomination process, and financial pressure exerted by
institutional investors, proxy advisors, and other observers.
1. Mandates
The most effective approach to increasing board diversity, but also the most
controversial, is the imposition of a government mandate requiring a certain
level of board diversity. In 2006, Norway adopted a gender diversity mandate or
quota requiring that Norwegian corporate boards achieve forty percent female
board representation by 2008, or be delisted. 45 There was full compliance with
this statute by 2009. 46 Many other countries followed suit. 47
41. See North Carolina Corporate Board Diversity 50 Largest North Carolina Companies:
2018 Survey, UNIV. OF N.C SCH. OF L., https://ddi.law.unc.edu/boarddiversity/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2021) (chart comparing 2018 corporate board diversity of Fortune 100, Fortune 500, and NC Top
50—which only has a few Fortune 500 companies in it).
42. DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 134 (6th ed. 2019).
43. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
45. WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 42; AARON A. DHIR,
CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY
76–77, 105 (2015).
46. DHIR, supra note 45, at 105.
47. See generally WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 42, at
4, 16. There are now board gender diversity quotas mandating forty percent female board
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In 2018, California adopted its first board diversity mandate, requiring that
by the end of 2019 there be at least one woman director on the board of any
company either incorporated or headquartered in California. 48 Depending on the
size of the board, additional female board members may be required by the end
of 2021. 49 A $100,000 fine will be levied against companies that are not in
compliance with the statute, and the fine increases to $300,000 for the second
and subsequent violations. 50 In 2020, a second board diversity mandate followed
when California added representational requirements for other underrepresented
groups as demonstrated by race, ethnicity, or LGBTQ+ status. 51 This
representation must be achieved by December 31, 2021. 52 The California
statutory diversity mandates are controversial and are being challenged as a
violation of the equal protection clause of both the United States and the
California state constitutions. 53
The California gender diversity mandate has had a significant impact on the
gender composition of California public company boards. According to a
progress report issued by the California Partners Project, since 2018, the number
of public company board seats held by women has increased 93.6%, from 766
to 1483. 54 Moreover, in 2021, 93% of California’s 142 smallest public
companies now have at least one female board member, up from only 47% with
at least one female board member in 2018. 55
2. Board Diversity Targets with Consequences
In a major development, on August 6, 2021, the SEC adopted a proposal by
Nasdaq, one of the two major public exchanges for trading stock in the United
States. 56 The SEC added to the requirements for a company’s shares to be listed
representation in France and Iceland; thirty-three percent female representation in Belgium, Italy,
and Portugal; thirty percent in Austria, Germany, Malaysia, and the Netherlands. Id. at 80, 84, 102,
106, 115, 120, 130, 142, 214.
48. S.B. 826, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as amended at CAL. CORP. CODE. §
301.3 (West 2020)).
49. Id. If the corporation has five directors, then there must be a minimum of two female
directors by December 31, 2021, and if the corporation has six or more directors, then the minimum
number of female directors increases to three. Id.
50. Id.
51. A.B. 979, 2020 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (codified as amended CAL. CORP. CODE.
§ 301.3 (West 2020)).
52. Id.
53. Malathi Nayak, Lawsuits Challenge California’s Corporate Board Diversity Quotas, L.A.
TIMES (July 13, 2021, 3:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-07-13/californiacorporate-board-diversity-quotas-face-legal-challenge.
54. CAL. PARTNERS PROJECT, CLAIM YOUR SEAT: WOMEN OF COLOR ON CALIFORNIA’S
PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDS 8 (2021).
55. Id. at 7.
56. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board
Diversity, 86 Fed. Reg. 44,424, 44,424–25 (Aug. 6, 2021).
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on Nasdaq a board diversity target of at least two diverse members, coupled with
a uniform board diversity disclosure requirement. 57 In the event the company
does not meet the target, it must explain why not. 58 Of the two “diverse”
directors, at least one must be a self-identified female and at least one must selfidentify as an underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+. 59 One of the justifications
for the Nasdaq proposal was the connection between greater diversity and
investor protection, including “enhancing the quality of a company’s financial
reporting, internal controls, public disclosures, and management oversight.” 60
The state of Washington adopted a statute in 2020 that requires all publicly
traded companies incorporated in Washington to have at least twenty-five
percent female board members by January 1, 2022, or explain how the company
considered diverse groups (not just women, but also racial minorities and other
historically underrepresented groups) during the board nomination process. 61
Australia, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom
also have board diversity “comply or explain” requirements. 62
3. Legal Disclosure Requirements
Nasdaq’s board diversity rule also mandates disclosure in a uniform format
of the self-identified gender, race, and LGBTQ+ status of a listed corporation’s
directors. 63 Nasdaq cited the cost and time burden for multiple interested
observers to collect the same information from companies as one justification

57. Id. Nasdaq’s original proposal was filed with the SEC on December 1, 2020. Id. at 44,424.
It filed an amended proposal on February 26, 2021, which provided some additional flexibility for
companies. See Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 1, 73. For instance, for a “Smaller Reporting
Company” as defined by market capitalization or revenues, the amended proposal provides that the
second diverse director may be a second female. Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 85; Order
Instituting Proceedings to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,484,
14,486 & n.24 (Mar. 10, 2021). The amended proposal permits a company with five or fewer board
members to have just one diverse member. Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 86; Order Instituting
Proceedings to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,484, 14,486 (Mar.
10, 2021).
58. Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 9.
59. Order Instituting Proceedings to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, 86 Fed.
Reg. 14,484, 14,485 (Mar. 16, 2021). “Underrepresented Minority” is defined to include someone
“who self-identifies as one or more of the following: Black or African American, Hispanic or
Latinx, Asian, Native American or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or Two or
More Races or Ethnicities.” Id. LGBTQ+ is defined as “an individual who self-identifies as any of
the following: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or as a member of the queer community.” Id.
60. Id. at 14,490; Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 29 (and studies reviewed at pages 29–35).
61. Subst. S.B. 6037, 66th Leg., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020) (codified as amended at 805
WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.120 (2020)).
62. Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 120.
63. Order Instituting Proceedings to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, 86 Fed.
Reg. at 14,488.
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for this aspect of its proposal. 64 Moreover, it noted that in the business world,
“what gets measured, gets managed,” as further reason to provide transparency
around board diversity metrics. 65 At the state level, Illinois, 66 Maryland, 67 and
New York 68 have mandated disclosure of certain board diversity metrics.
Effective in 2010, the SEC amended Regulation S-K, which prescribes the
contents of proxy statements and other filings, to require disclosure of whether
and how a board’s nominating committee considers diversity in identifying
board candidates. 69 Further, if the board has a policy regarding diversity and the
identification of board nominees, the proxy should describe how that policy is
implemented and assess the effectiveness of the policy. 70 A board diversity
policy, however, is not mandated. In addition, each company may define
“diversity” for itself, and some companies have defined diversity to include a
variety of factors that may or may not include gender, racial, or ethnic
diversity. 71 A perhaps unintended consequence of the SEC regulation is that
companies may decline to create a diversity policy, so they do not have to
describe its implementation and assess its effectiveness. 72

64. See Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 59.
65. Id. at 121 (quoting Acting Securities & Exchange Commission Chair Allison Herren Lee);
Id. at 52 (“It is difficult to improve what one cannot accurately measure.”).
66. H.B. 3394, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019) (codified as amended at 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.12(c) (Lexis Nexis 2019)) (requiring corporations with their principal
executive office in Illinois to disclose information about the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of
their boards).
67. H.B. 1116, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019) (codified as amended at MD. CODE. ANN.,
TAX–PROP. § 11-101(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2019)) (requiring all business entities, including nonprofits
with an annual operating budget exceeding $5 million, with corporate headquarters in Maryland to
disclose the number of female directors and the total number of directors).
68. S.B. 4278, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (codified as amended at N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW § 408.3-1(d) (McKinney 2019)) (requiring all foreign and domestic corporations,
publicly traded and privately held, to report the number of directors and how many of the directors
are female).
69. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44 (Dec. 23,
2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi)).
70. Id.
71. Nili, supra note 2, at 187 (“[M]any companies comply with the letter of the regulation by
defining diversity broadly enough to incorporate any possible difference between people.”).
However, the number of Fortune 100 companies mentioning gender, racial, or ethnic diversity as a
factor in director selection increased for each factor for the first year the proxy rule was in effect:
gender (nine to forty-one companies), race (two to twenty-five companies), and ethnicity (seven to
twenty-seven companies). Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, Board Diversity and Proxy
Disclosure, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39, 69–70 (2011).
72. Nili, supra note 2, at 188 (describing the disincentive to creating a diversity policy); Hazen
& Broome, supra note 71, at 65–66 (finding that in the first year this disclosure was in effect,
twenty-eight of the Fortune 100 companies “specifically stated that they did not have a diversity
policy even though they may have ‘considered’ diversity in selecting director-nominees” perhaps
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4. Investor Influence and Advocacy Groups
Several large corporate institutional investors have also announced their
desire for their portfolio companies to achieve certain board diversity targets,
with the consequence for failure to achieve the goal being that the investor will
vote against some or all of the company’s director nominees in the next director
election. BlackRock, the largest worldwide institutional investor, encourages its
portfolio companies to have diverse boards that include at least two female board
members 73 and encourages its portfolio companies to disclose the demographic
data regarding the diversity of their boards. 74 If a company has “not adequately
accounted for diversity in its board composition within a reasonable time frame
. . . [BlackRock] may vote against members of the nominating/governance
committee for an apparent lack of commitment to board effectiveness.” 75
Without naming a specific diversity target, Vanguard Asset Management,
another large institutional investor, will vote against the chairs of nominating or
governance committees where there is a sufficient lack of progress on board
diversity. 76
The two main proxy advisory firms that advise shareholders how to vote in
corporate elections are Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS). 77 Glass Lewis recommends withholding votes from the chair of the
company’s nominating committee if there are not at least two women on the
board by 2022, while ISS recommends withholding votes if there is a lack of
racial and ethnic diversity or lack of disclosure regarding such board diversity
by 2022. 78
In a parallel development, there are a number of prominent organizations,
such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that are using their platforms to
advocate for increased board diversity. 79 Consulting firms and search firms are
because of the additional requirements regarding a description of implementation and an evaluation
of effectiveness).
73. BLACKROCK INV. STEWARDSHIP, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES 6
(2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investmentguidelines-us.pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. VANGUARD, SUMMARY OF THE PROXY VOTING POLICY FOR U.S. PORTFOLIO
COMPANIES 6–7 (2021), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-companyresources/2021_proxy_voting_summary.pdf.
77. See Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 55.
78. Id.
79. NACD and U.S. Chamber of Commerce Partner to Accelerate Progress on Diversity in
America’s Boardrooms, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.uschamber.com/
diversity/nacd-and-us-chamber-of-commerce-partner-accelerate-progress-diversity-americas
(describing a partnership between the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of
Corporate Directors to advance board diversity by identifying at least 250 Black executives to enter
the NACD’s Accelerate board training program by 2022).
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also providing research and thought leadership to advocate for increased board
diversity. 80
5. New Networks that Promote Potential Diverse Directors
Board platforms such as Diligent and Equilar, which are used by sitting
corporate executives and board members to initiate executive and board
searches, have invited members of various corporate board diversity-focused
organizations to join their databases. 81 There are a growing number of
organizations that work with various pools of diverse board candidates. 82 Most
of these organizations maintain databases for companies to use to gain access to
diverse talent or post open board position descriptions for their members to view
and self-nominate. 83 Nasdaq also commits to providing complimentary access
for a limited period of time to a board recruiting tool that is used to assist
companies in recruiting diverse board candidates. 84
6. A Broader View of Who Would Be a Good Director
In prior years, when companies sought new directors, they looked primarily
for sitting or recently retired chief executive officers or chief financial officers. 85
This limited pool had very few diverse candidates. As attention on greater board
diversity has increased, many companies have widened their lens and have also
tried to be more strategic in identifying and matching skill sets that would be
80. See, e.g., Maria Castañón Moats & Paul DeNicola, Boardroom Diversity Should Top
Directors’ Agenda, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/governance-insights-center/
library/boardroom-agenda-diversity.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2021); SPENCERSTUART, 2020 U.S.
SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 1–2 (2020), https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2020/
december/ssbi2020/us_spencer_stuart_board_index_2020.pdf (discussing board diversity).
81. A Board Diversity Network for Modern Governance Leadership, DILIGENT,
https://info.diligent.com/solutions/diversity/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021) (describing the Diligent
Modern Leadership Network to assist corporations in finding diverse board candidates); Equilar
Diversity Network, EQUILAR, https://www.equilar.com/diversity (last visited Oct. 13, 2021)
(describing the Equilar Diversity Network).
82. Director Diversity Initiative, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF L., https://ddi.law.unc.edu/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2021) (One such organization is the Director Diversity Initiative at the University
of North Carolina School of Law, which is headed by Lissa Broome. The DDI works with women,
people of color, and other groups that are underrepresented on corporate boards on training and
through a database to help corporations find diverse potential directors) [hereinafter Director
Diversity Initiative Homepage]; Director Diversity Initiative: Other Organizations, UNIV. OF N.C.
SCH. OF L., https://ddi.law.unc.edu/organizations/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021) (The DDI maintains
a list of many of the other organizations similarly focused on increasing diversity on corporate
boards) [hereinafter Other Organizations].
83. Director Diversity Initiative Homepage, supra note 82; Other Organizations, supra note
82.
84. See Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 20.
85. Id. at 19 (noting that in the traditional nomination process, directors look “within their own
social networks for candidates with previous C-suite experience”).
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helpful to the company in achieving its objectives. This has led to consideration
of a broader pool of board candidates, with less regard for titles. Division
presidents and others with extensive profit and loss experience are now often
considered for board roles, even if they have not been part of a C-suite. In
making the newly adopted SEC diversity proposal, Nasdaq noted that the
corporate leaders it spoke with “reinforced the notion that if companies recruit
by skill set and expertise rather than title, they will find there is more than
enough diverse talent to satisfy demand.” 86
E.

Summary

There are many arguments made in the corporate context about why
diversity improves governing board performance. 87 In recent years, legislators
and regulators have seemingly adopted these arguments and have acted upon
them by passing laws or stock exchange rules that address board diversity in the
variety of ways discussed above. 88 If a state believes that SMB diversity is
important, the most effective way to achieve it is by a legal mandate. 89 The
mandate may be easier to achieve for a government-created legal body, like an
SMB, than in the corporate sector.
III. CAN MEDICINE LEARN FROM THE LAWYER DISCIPLINE EXPERIENCE?
Because of the many similarities between the legal and medical professions,
the bar’s experience with discipline and diversity might well be useful to
medicine. Lawyers, like doctors, are state-licensed and state-regulated
professionals. 90 Both groups are capable of inflicting significant harm on those
they purport to serve. The perceived complexity of both professions has led to
the conclusion that the public is incapable of judging their members’
competence, and that those judgments must largely be left to the profession
itself. 91 In the case of lawyers, state legislatures have delegated to a statesanctioned lawyers’ organization—usually called the state bar, as distinct from
state bar associations, which are private trade organizations—the tasks of
assessing and admitting candidates for licensure, setting standards for
professional conduct, and adjudicating alleged violations of those standards. 92

86. Id. at 19–20.
87. See supra notes 2–18 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text.
90. Lawyer Licensing, A.B.A, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_services/flh-home/
flh-lawyer-licensing/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
91. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 23–24 (2010)
(describing professional work as “so specialized as to be inaccessible” to outsiders).
92. Consumer FAQs, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibil
ity/resources/resources_for_the_public/consumer_faqs/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
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Patterns of State Bar Discipline

Examples drawn from the bars of the two largest states by population will
illustrate the variations on this structural theme. In Texas:
The Supreme Court of Texas has the constitutional and statutory responsibility
within the State for the lawyer discipline and disability system and has inherent
power to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct and to dispose
of individual cases of lawyer discipline and disability in a manner that does not
discriminate by race, creed, color, sex, or national origin. To carry out this
responsibility, the Court promulgates the following rules for lawyer discipline
and disability proceedings [the substantive Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure]. Subject
to the inherent power of the Supreme Court of Texas, the responsibility for
administering and supervising lawyer discipline and disability is delegated to
the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas. Authority to adopt rules of
procedure and administration not inconsistent with these rules is vested in the
Board. 93

The disciplinary system is overseen by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline. 94
It has twelve members: six lawyers appointed by the president of the State Bar
and six public members appointed by the Texas Supreme Court. 95 In
consultation with the State Bar Board of Directors, the Commission supervises
the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (CDC), which administers the attorney
discipline system. 96 When it receives a complaint against a lawyer, the CDC
refers it to one of seventeen geographic District Grievance Committees
(DGCs). 97 The DGCs are staffed by 357 volunteer members, two-thirds of
whom are lawyers; the remaining one-third are members of the public with no
financial interest in the practice of law.98 All members are nominated by the
State Bar director for the particular district and appointed by the State Bar
president. 99 The DGC reviews the complaint and has the ultimate say on
“whether the case should be dismissed or proceed to prosecution.” 100 If the case
proceeds, the DGC “sit[s] as an administrative tribunal to determine whether
professional misconduct was committed and assess an appropriate sanction.” 101

93. THE SUP. CT. OF TEX., TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE 3 (2021).
94. Id. at 28–29.
95. COMM’N FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE, STATE BAR OF TEX., ANNUAL REPORT: JUNE 1, 2019 –
MAY 31, 2020 2–3 (2020), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Annual_
Reports&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=54491.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id. at 13.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. COMM’N FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE, supra note 95, at 13.
101. Id.
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A lawyer may appeal a decision of the DGC within the State Bar system and,
ultimately, to the Texas Supreme Court. 102
Demographically, the DGCs are fairly representative of Texas lawyers, and
slightly more diverse than the lawyer population as a whole. Of the attorney
members of the DGCs, fifty-eight percent are male and forty-two percent are
female, versus sixty-four percent and thirty-six percent for the overall State Bar
of Texas membership. 103 The attorneys on the DGCs are seventy percent white,
five percent Black or African American, and sixteen percent Hispanic/Latino;
the corresponding percentages for the bar as a whole are seventy-nine percent,
six percent, and ten percent. 104
The lawyers who are disciplined are far less representative of the
demographics of the legal community. During the 2019–2020 year, when
disciplinary proceedings were delayed by the pandemic, there were 403 total
disciplinary sanctions; 30 Texas lawyers were disbarred or resigned in lieu of
discipline, and another 181 were suspended or publicly reprimanded. 105 (There
are about 93,000 lawyers in Texas.)106 Seventy-nine percent of the disciplinary
respondents were male, though men comprise only sixty-four percent of the
bar. 107 But while seventy-nine percent of lawyers are white, only fifty-four
percent of those disciplined were. 108 Conversely, thirteen percent of the
disciplinary respondents were Black/African American, despite being only six
percent of the total bar membership; Hispanic/Latino lawyers comprise twentyone percent of those disciplined versus ten percent of the bar. 109 For whatever
reason, then, Black and Hispanic lawyers are disciplined at about twice their rate
of representation in the bar, whereas white lawyers are disciplined at a rate that
is about seventy-five percent of what would be predicted from bar membership.
In California, complaints against lawyers are initially investigated by the
State Bar’s Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC). 110 If the OCTC determines
that charges are warranted, it files and prosecutes them in the State Bar Court,
“an independent professional Court dedicated to ruling on attorney discipline
cases” that is the only one of its kind in the country. 111 The Bar Court is staffed
by a presiding judge and two other review judges appointed by the California
102. TEXAS RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE, supra note 93, at 21–22. A lawyer may also
opt out of the State Bar procedure and elect to have the complaint heard in court. Id. at 22.
103. COMM’N FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE, supra note 95, at 14.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5, 7.
106. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (2020), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/news/2020/07/potlp2020.pdf.
107. COMM’N FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE, supra note 95, at 7, 14.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Conduct & Discipline, STATE BAR CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/ConductDiscipline (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
111. Home, STATE BAR CT. CAL., http://www.statebarcourt.ca.gov/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
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Supreme Court, and five hearing judges appointed by the California Supreme
Court and the legislature, all full-time. 112 Cases proceed from trial before a
hearing judge to appellate review by the review judges, with final appeal
available to the California Supreme Court. 113 The Bar Court has authority to
issue a full range of sanctions, from “private reprovals” to recommendations that
the Supreme Court suspend or disbar a lawyer. 114 In 2020, the OCTC opened
nearly 17,500 cases against lawyers and other people fraudulently claiming to
be lawyers, filed 180 cases in State Bar Court, and recommended disbarment for
97 lawyers and suspension for another 114. 115
There are currently 190,000 licensed lawyers on active status in
California. 116 According to the most recent detailed statistics (2017), about fiftyseven percent identify as male and forty-one percent as female. 117 Of these
licensed lawyers, 80.3% are white, 5.9% are Asian, 4.6% are Hispanic, and 1.9%
are Black. 118 About twenty-one percent of lawyers are in solo practice and
eighteen percent are in small firms; the next two largest practice categories are
corporate in-house (nine percent) and large firms (eight percent). 119 That said,
most California lawyers are male, a large majority are white, and a significant
plurality practice in small or solo settings.
Against this background, in 2019, the State Bar commissioned a study of
racial disparities in lawyer discipline by George Farkas, an education professor
at the University of California, Irvine. 120 Farkas used data on all lawyers
admitted in California from 1990 through 2009 (more than 116,000 lawyers) and
evaluated disciplinary actions from 1990 through 2018. 121 The key findings of
the study were:

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Discipline Statistics, STATE BAR CAL., http://apps.calbar.ca.gov/discipline (last visited
Oct. 13, 2021).
116. Historic Demographics, STATE BAR CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-WeAre/Historic-Demographics (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
117. OFF. OF RSCH. & INST. ACCOUNTABILITY, THE STATE BAR OF CAL., SUMMARY RESULTS
OF FIVE-YEAR ATTORNEY SURVEY, 2017 14 (2017), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/
documents/reports/ORIA/Survey-2017.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1.
120. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., STATE BAR CONDUCTS FIRST OF ITS KIND STUDY ON RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/
0/documents/factSheets/Racial-Disparities-in-Attorney-Discipline-Fact-Sheet.pdf [hereinafter
CAL. STATE BAR STUDY].
121. Id.
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• During the study period, 3.2 percent of black male attorneys were placed on
probation, compared to 0.9 percent of white male attorneys.
• During the study period, 3.9 percent of black male attorneys were disbarred
or resigned, compared to 1.0 percent of white males.
• Differences were smaller for Latino males and for black and Latino females
compared to white females.
• There were no meaningful differences for Asians compared to whites. 122

These disparities were statistically significant, 123 meaning that they cannot be
plausibly attributed to chance. The study also found that solo practitioners—
more than one in five California lawyers, and the largest single category among
practice settings—were more likely to be disciplined than lawyers in larger
firms, by a statistically significant margin. 124
The study considered factors that could account for these differences. With
respect to the racial disparities in suspension and disbarment rates, the study
found that the differential rates are largely explained by:
• an attorney’s previous discipline history, which was found to have the
strongest effect on discipline outcomes;
• the number of complaints received about an attorney;
• the number of investigations opened against an attorney; and
• the percentage of investigations in which the attorney was represented by
counsel. 125

While these explanatory factors may be statistically sound in the sense that
they correlate strongly with disciplinary outcomes, the first and third seem
circular from a real-world perspective. The fact that Black male lawyers tend to
have more extensive prior discipline histories and are more often investigated
does not “explain” why they are disciplined at a disproportionate rate. Rather,
these seem to be alternative measures of the same phenomenon: the bar takes
disciplinary steps against Black male lawyers significantly more frequently than
their representation in the bar would predict. The second factor—number of
complaints received—depends on the actions of clients, not the bar; as discussed
below, it is susceptible to multiple interpretations. 126 The fourth factor—
representation by counsel—has a plausible (and non-circular) explanation:
retaining counsel may increase the likelihood of a successful defense to a
complaint, and we speculate that Black lawyers are less likely to be able to pay
for representation. The same analysis would seem to be true with respect to the
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. CAL. STATE BAR STUDY, supra note 120.
126. See infra Section III.B (discussing possible explanations for the disciplinary disparities
observed).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

138

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:121

solo practitioner disparity, where the Farkas study identified the same set of
explanatory factors but found that controlling for them did not make the
underlying disparity go away. 127
B.

What Could Explain These Disparities?

In seeking real-world explanations for the disciplinary disparities observed
in Texas, California, and elsewhere, one possible interpretation of the data is that
Black and (in Texas) Hispanic lawyers more often engage in unprofessional
conduct. There is no a priori reason to accept this hypothesis. In fact, there is no
reason at all, unless we assume that bar discipline, from complaint to sanction,
is a race- and ethnicity-neutral process. But, as explained below, the state bars
themselves have not made this assumption. 128
Moving to other possible explanations, an obvious potential explanation is
bias of various forms, among clients, the bar, or both. Clients may be more prone
to see the work of Black and (in Texas) Hispanic male lawyers as falling short
of their expectations, and then to report them to the state bar. The state bars, in
turn, may be more willing to take disciplinary action against such lawyers than
they are against lawyers in other demographic categories. This explanation
would be consistent with California’s Farkas study. 129 The likelihood of
discipline correlates significantly with the number of complaints previously filed
against a lawyer. 130 If Black and Hispanic men have disproportionately more
complaints filed against them, even a nondiscriminatory disciplinary system
would be expected to sanction them more often; that disparity would only
increase if the system were also motivated by bias.
Another plausible story focuses on the disparate rates of client complaints,
as well as factors other than bias. A starting point is that individual clients file
far more complaints than corporate clients, and individuals are typically

127. With respect to the solo practitioner disparity, the Farkas study identified the same set of
explanatory factors, but found that controlling them did not make the underlying disparity go away:
“When the statistical model evaluating discipline by firm size controls for other factors, such as
number of complaints and percentage of investigations in which the attorney was represented by
counsel, the disproportionate impact on solo practitioners declines substantially, but remains
statistically significant for the likelihood of an attorney being placed on probation.” CAL. STATE
BAR STUDY, supra note 120. It should also be noted that Farkas’ data on disciplinary bias against
solo practitioners is consistent with substantial qualitative evidence that solo and small-firm
lawyers believe that they are targeted for bar discipline. As one solo lawyer memorably put it,
“[w]hen you look at them, when you read the decisions as I do, it’s a disproportionate number of
solo guys who get nailed and I don’t believe in a heartbeat that the Wall Street guys are so much
more ethical.” Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 372 (2004).
128. See infra Section III.C.
129. CAL. STATE BAR STUDY, supra note 120.
130. Id.
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represented by solo practitioners and small firms. 131 Moreover, most individuals
rarely use lawyers and their matters are of relatively greater importance to them,
often involving life crises like arrest, divorce, or a significant personal injury. 132
When things go wrong, any perceived shortcoming on the part of the lawyer will
be magnified. On the other hand, businesses, especially larger ones, are regular
legal customers. When businesses are dissatisfied with their legal services—
unless they view the lawyer’s conduct as truly egregious—they just hire a new
law firm. 133 Filing a complaint with the bar would be a lot of trouble with little
prospect of economic return, and doing so might make it harder to hire lawyers
in the future. 134 Because small-practice lawyers represent the kinds of clients
who are more likely to complain, they receive a disproportionate amount of
complaints and, consequently, a disproportionate share of the discipline that
state bars mete out. 135 Moreover, because minority lawyers are more likely to
work in smaller practices, 136 they, too, are more likely to be involved in the
disciplinary process for reasons only secondarily related to race.
Neither the data reported above nor any other data we have discovered
enables us to separate the respective effects of race and firm size on discipline,
and thus to choose between race as a causal or coincidental factor in accounting
for disparate discipline rates. The state bars of Texas and California have taken

131. Lynn Mather & Leslie C. Levin, Why Context Matters, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE:
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 3, 13 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012).
132. See Lynn Mather & Craig A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The
Challenges of Divorce Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
CONTEXT 63, 71–78 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (providing multiple examples of
such crises and their impact on clients).
133. See Mather & Levin, supra note 131, at 13. These explanations are consistent with the
data reported by the Texas bar, which shows that the largest proportion of sanctions occur in the
practice categories of civil law, which is undefined but presumably relates to litigation (thirty
percent); family law (twenty-seven percent); criminal law (twenty-two percent); and personal
injury (fourteen percent). COMM’N FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE, supra note 95, at 15.
134. See What If I Am Unhappy with My Lawyer?, A.B.A. (June 7, 2018), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/public-information/what-if-i-am-unhappy-withmy-lawyer-/ (illustrating the difficulty of filing a grievance). In the computerized systems that many
law firms use to screen prospective clients, the lawyer proposing the representation is routinely
asked whether the new client has recently fired other lawyers or firms or has a reputation for doing
so. Some processes may also ask whether the client has filed bar complaints or malpractice claims.
See, e.g., STATE BAR OF GA., PROSPECTIVE CLIENT INTERVIEW, https://www.gabar.org/commit
teesprogramssections/programs/lpm/upload/pci.pdf (providing a sample client interview form that
asks if the client has previously consulted other attorneys in the matter and why the client was
dissatisfied with those attorneys).
135. See Mather & Levin, supra note 131, at 13.
136. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT CARD ON THE DIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA’S LEGAL
PROFESSION 8 (2020), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/State-Bar-AnnualDiversity-Report.pdf.
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the disparities as troubling evidence of potential bias and have begun to address
the issue.
C. State Bar Responses
The Texas bar has focused on the makeup of its local disciplinary
committees, or DGCs. As noted above, the DGCs are already more diverse than
the bar itself. 137 In its 2020 report, the bar endorses such representation,
affirming that DGCs should “fairly represent the racial, ethnic, and gender
makeup of the [lawyers in the] districts they serve.” 138 The bar specifically
commits “to make appointments that maintain this diversity in membership.” 139
Significantly, this commitment includes “the goal that lawyer members reflect
various practice areas and law firm size[s].” 140 The bar observes that “[t]he most
common areas of practice by committee membership are general practice,
criminal law, family law, personal injury law, and probate law, which are also
the most common types of law related to filed grievances.141
In a vague response to the Farkas study, the California state bar promised
further research on “disparities in the number of complaints filed by attorney
race, gender, and solo practice status; how complaints and prior discipline are
taken into account during the State Bar investigations process; and the bases for
the differential impact of counsel representation on disciplinary outcomes.” 142
Specific measures will await the recommendations of a future consultant.
D. Summary and Implications for Medicine
As the preceding Sections make clear, the state bars of the two largest states
think that diversity is relevant to discipline. Both California and Texas perceive
a problem with the disparate impact of bar discipline, especially against Black
male lawyers. 143 There is also shared concern with the way discipline affects
small and solo practices and the areas of law in which smaller practices tend to
concentrate. Whether the race and firm size effects are unrelated, correlated, or
causally related remains an open question, with plausible arguments available to
support all three positions.
The California and Texas bars are also manifesting a belief that diversity
within the groups that carry out professional discipline is important to ensure
both the appearance and the reality of fairness. A secondary objective is to make
137. COMM’N FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE, STATE BAR OF TEX., ANNUAL REPORT: JUNE 1, 2020 –
MAY 31, 2021 16 (2020), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Annual_Reports
&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=54492.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. CAL. STATE BAR STUDY, supra note 120.
143. See id.
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aggrieved clients more comfortable about asserting complaints and more
confident in the justice of outcomes. 144 Nonetheless, neither state cites—nor
could cite, to our knowledge—hard empirical evidence that disciplinary board
diversity has an impact on disciplinary outcomes or on the comfort or confidence
of clients.
It is not clear that these bar disciplinary developments can be directly applied
in the medical context. The major difference is that whereas medicine is worried
primarily about the lack of professional discipline and its impact on patient
safety, 145 the bar’s diversity initiatives are focused on a different problem:
protecting lawyers from unfair discipline. 146 State bars are concerned about
protecting clients, of course, but that concern tends to focus on finding and
disciplining rogue actors and firms, not on the disciplinary process itself.
Nonetheless, if, as our corporate board research suggests, diversity may improve
the general quality of small-group decision making, then those benefits should
be found in all contexts, including all forms of professional discipline. In the
next Part, we return to the arguments that have been advanced in favor of
corporate board diversity and consider which of them may be applicable to
medical disciplinary boards.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR BOARD DIVERSITY REVISITED: WHICH APPLY TO
MEDICAL BOARDS?
In this Part, we revisit the arguments for corporate board diversity that we
raised at the beginning of the article, drawing on both the relevant literature and
our own qualitative research. Each of the arguments from the business literature
was also made in our interviews and supplemented by additional rationales
provided by our respondents for increasing board diversity. With respect to each
argument, we ask whether it sheds any light on the value of diversity on SMBs.
Where appropriate, we also mention specific points of learning from the bar
discipline experience.
A.

Arguments from the Business Literature

Fairness. This justification for board diversity takes both a broad and a
narrow form. The broad argument is simply that fundamental fairness dictates
that bodies as powerful as corporate boards should reflect the society that
provides a corporation not only with its customers, but its very reason for

144. COMM’N FOR LAW. DISCIPLINE, supra note 95, at 7.
145. Pendo et al., supra note 1, at 20.
146. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., DIVERSITY, EQUITY, & INCLUSION PLAN: 2021–2022,
BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 12 (2021), https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/
documents/reports/Diversity-Equity-Inclusion-Plan-Report-2021-2022.pdf.
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being. 147 A narrower version is that fairness requires that the board should reflect
the internal diversity of the company. The legal profession has adopted both
versions of this rationale in its concern with disciplinary board diversity. 148 The
fairness argument applies directly in the medical discipline context. In fact, it is
even more compelling in the case of professions like medicine and law, which
presumably exist to serve society, and which enjoy the extraordinary legal
privilege of self-regulation.
Business justifications. Because a medical disciplinary board, like a state
bar, is not a for-profit entity, 149 the business case argument that board diversity
is correlated with improved corporate performance is not applicable in the
medical board context. The remaining business justifications—other than one—
apply directly to medical boards.
• More diversity can reduce agency costs: These costs arise when corporate
managers act in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of the
company. 150 The argument here is that diverse boards may be less deferential
to management than traditional senior, white male boards, and thus more
likely to monitor and crack down on self-dealing. In this one instance, it is
difficult to see the applicability to disciplinary boards since there is no
manager-board member divide. 151
• More diversity can lead to more and better information: 152 People from
different backgrounds (in every sense) are thought to possess different kinds
of information, given different experiences and contacts, and to be able to
bring that to board deliberations. This seems to apply strongly to disciplinary
boards. The pool of potential patient-victims that the boards exist to protect
is the entire population, so they can only benefit from improved information
about as many segments of that population as possible.
• More diversity may cause boards to operate differently, and better: 153 The
argument is that homogenous boards move quickly and tend toward rubberstamping management recommendations, whereas more diverse boards slow
down and talk things out, motivated by their different sensibilities and

147. Debra Rainey, Does Your Board Reflect the Communities You Serve?, INDEP. SECTOR
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://independentsector.org/news-post/does-your-board-reflect-the-communitiesyou-serve/.
148. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
149. Membership Information, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., https://www.fsmb.org/aboutfsmb/fsmb-member-medical-boards/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
150. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 764.
151. Nonetheless, it might be argued that having the profession police itself (by other
professionals) is an agency problem and that boards need more public members, who would be
analogous to the corporate board’s individual members overseeing and policing corporate
managers. Stephen E. Heretick, The Role of Public Members on State Medical Boards, J. MED.
REGUL., Mar. 2010, at 6, 6.
152. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 764.
153. Id.; see supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
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information sources. Substitute “recommended discipline” for “management
recommendations” in the preceding sentence, and this argument applies
directly to medical disciplinary boards. Note that more careful deliberation
could lead to more or less discipline in individual cases.
• Send the right signals to observers, principally employees and customers: 154
It is very unlikely that customers have any idea who is on a corporate board,
and employees below the management level may also be unaware. But if the
signals are received, they may well generate good will for and confidence in
the signaling company. In the disciplinary board context, there are several
layers of potential signal recipients: individual doctors facing discipline,
patients who have filed complaints, the medical profession more generally,
and the broader patient community. Those in the first category will be aware
of who sits on their board, as will the complainants, if they participate directly
in the process. Within the professional community in a given state, only those
active in that community are likely to receive the signals, and the general
patient community will almost certainly be unaware of board membership. 155
For those who do get the signals, the effect will likely be significant, if not
necessarily reassuring. 156 Many patients will welcome seeing a range of
backgrounds represented, while some accused doctors might prefer seeing a
jury of people just like themselves. 157
• Diverse-looking boards will quiet diversity advocates: 158 This is the cynical
argument that diversity has no real value, but attention to box-checking will
get the shareholder activists off the board’s back. To the extent that some
companies may follow this reasoning, it is an argument that might prove
persuasive in any context that could draw public scrutiny, including medical
discipline.

B.

Arguments from Our Qualitative Research

Many of these academic arguments were given colloquial, sometimes
colorful expression in our interview study. All of the arguments apply in varying
degrees to medical boards.

154. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 762, 764; see also Signaling Through Board
Diversity, supra note 15, at 447.
155. Signaling Through Board Diversity, supra note 15, at 455, 458.
156. Id. at 453.
157. See Mary K. Totten, How and Why to Increase Board Diversity, AM. HOSP. ASS’N TR.
SERVS., https://trustees.aha.org/articles/916-how-and-why-to-increase-board-diversity (last visited
Oct. 13, 2021); Morgan Haefner, ‘We’ve Made No Progress’: Healthcare Boards 87% White,
Leverage Network Study Finds, BECKER’S HOSP. REV (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.beckers
hospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/we-ve-made-no-progress-healthcareboards-87-white-leverage-network-study-finds.html (both sources making similar suggestions).
158. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 793.
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• Board diversity is a moral imperative: 159 As raised in our interviews, this
argument tracks the fairness argument discussed above and applies to medical
disciplinary boards in exactly the same way. 160
• Diverse perspectives help avoid groupthink: 161 This is a specific version of
the academic argument for heterogenous boards. 162 Many of our informants
told us that “groupthink,” usually led by the most senior and prestigious
members, is far less of a danger on boards that include people of different
backgrounds and experience. None offered any significant examples, but, if
it has validity, this argument would certainly apply to medical disciplinary
boards.
• Perspectives from both Venus and Mars are valuable: 163 This argument is a
gender-focused instance of the belief that diverse boards have better
information and function more effectively. 164 It draws on both popular and
academic psychology writings about fundamental differences in the ways that
women and men approach and resolve problems. Here again, to the extent
that the argument is valid, it would also support gender diversity on
disciplinary boards. The recent trends in legal discipline reported in this
Article, with state bars seeking greater diversity in their disciplinary boards,
seem to embody this view. 165
• Diversity sends the right signals to employees: 166 The analysis of the
signaling argument is the same as presented above. The critical issue is
whether the target audiences are likely to receive the signals.
• Diverse boards will have greater empathy with employees and customers: 167
This argument first emerged from our interview data. Its point is that board
members who have overcome barriers themselves are more likely to
understand the needs and concerns of rank-and-file employees and ordinary
consumers than those who have been insulated by privilege. This would seem
to have direct applicability to disciplinary boards. We might expect that a
more diverse—in every sense of the word, from demography to medical
school to specialty to practice setting—disciplinary board would have greater
empathy for both accused doctors and patients alleging misconduct. If so,

159. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
160. See Lisa S. Rotenstein et al., Addressing Workforce Diversity — A Quality-Improvement
Framework, 384 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1083, 1083 (2021) (discussing how workforce diversity in
medicine “remains an elusive goal” and how medical boards should reflect the diversity of the
health care profession).
161. See Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 761.
162. Id. at 765.
163. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. See supra Part III.
166. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
167. Dangerous Categories, supra note 5, at 762, 786.
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then greater fairness to all parties might be expected. The bar discipline
examples reviewed above certainly reflect this view. 168
• Tap untapped talent pools: 169 This argument is straightforward and
utilitarian—the failure to seek diverse and previously underrepresented
people simply wastes a huge amount of potential talent. It is equally
applicable to medical disciplinary boards. If SMBs need to be representative
of the state, then this could be a problem, especially if SMB members must
be physicians and if the physician population is not representative of the
state’s demographic diversity. 170 Should SMBs look outside the medical
profession and, in addition, to public members who are considered related
health professionals (i.e., nurses)?
• Diverse boards will nurture broader executive pipelines and thereby promote
better executive succession: 171 This argument is a specific instance of the
untapped talent pool argument from the business literature. Perhaps the most
important function of any corporate board is to find and hire top executives.
Some of our interview subjects contended that white males from elite
backgrounds tend to limit their searches to people just like them, whereas
diverse board members cast a bigger net and bring in more and potentially
better candidates. In its simplest version, it is all about the definition of
“qualified.” This argument applies indirectly to disciplinary boards. While
diverse disciplinary board members do not hire anyone themselves, they
become candidates for other leadership positions in the future, broadening the
talent pool for those who will direct the medical profession. Their
membership thus contributes to a virtuous circle of ever more inclusive
leadership, versus the closed loop that ensues if disciplinary board
membership is limited to senior and already prestigious doctors.

V. WHAT DO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO CORPORATE BOARD DIVERSITY
AND STATE BAR DISCIPLINE BOARDS SUGGEST FOR SMBS?
One of the reasons this symposium proposed increasing SMB diversity is to
protect patients from egregious wrongdoing by physicians. The Nasdaq
corporate board diversity proposal cites investor protection as a justification for
greater corporate board diversity based on studies that show that more diverse
boards often provide better oversight over a company’s actions. 172 This indicates
that board diversification is in the public interest.
To achieve greater diversity on an SMB, this project recommends a target
approach so that the SMB reflects “[t]o the extent practicable” the “geographic,

168. See supra Section III.A.
169. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Board Members, NEV. ST. BOARD OF MED. EXAM’RS, https://medboard.nv.gov/
About/Board/Members/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
171. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
172. Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 29–35.
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racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of the State.” 173 In contrast, the targets used
in the corporate board diversity world are all much more specific, in some cases
with the number of diverse candidates increasing as the size of the board
increases. 174 Well-defined targets are much easier to hit than those that are
vague. So, we suggest that consideration be given to either adopting specific
numerical targets or requiring that each SMB determine the demographic
makeup of its state and the acceptable range of representation on the SMB as
compared to that makeup. For instance, if women make up fifty percent of the
population, perhaps the percentage of female SMB members should be between
forty-five and fifty-five percent of the board.
The target approach in the world of corporate boards often has two other
components missing in the SMB proposal—a disclosure requirement and
consequences for failing to meet the target. In the case of the Nasdaq proposal,
the requirement that boards annually disclose their board diversity in a common
format may end up being more impactful than the target of two diverse board
members. 175 In reality, two diverse board members is not a very high bar, but as
shareholders focus more on board diversity, knowing the exact composition of
the board via self-disclosed racial, ethnic, and sexual orientation status provides
important information, particularly as the expectations for diverse board
members increase beyond the minimal requirement of two. It is also important
that the disclosure is done uniformly, according to the same set of diversity terms
with specific definitions so that the comparison between companies is applesto-apples. The SMB proposal should consider requiring reporting of board
diversity characteristics on a standard form according to common definitions.
As a further refinement, if the target has been defined by the state demographics,
the disclosure should include a comparison with the state’s demographic targets.
The Nasdaq proposal is also a form of “comply or explain.” If the company
fails to meet the board diversity requirement, there is a consequence in that it
must explain why it does not meet the target. 176 That may be a minimal
consequence for failing to meet the target of two diverse board members, but is
better than nothing. The SMB proposal should consider whether such an
explanation would be helpful to the public. If the public did not find the
explanation adequate, one could imagine that advocates would clamor for
additional diversity or assist the SMB in overcoming the difficulties that it
described for why it was unable to achieve SMB diversity consistent with the
state’s demographic diversity.
We have yet to see what effect the Nasdaq’s target approach will have on
corporate board diversity. The bar is not high, and there is always concern that
173.
174.
175.
176.

Pendo et al., supra note 1.
See Nasdaq Proposal, supra note 6, at 139.
Id. at 263–64.
Id. at 9.
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a minimum requirement may be seen as sufficient to achieve the full effects of
diversity when that is likely not to be the case. The concern is that the floor also
becomes the ceiling and further diversity is not achieved. The SMB diversity
threshold of diverse members consistent with state demographics is considerably
more diverse than two diverse corporate board candidates (one of whom is a
woman) so it is possible that this target (once numbers are put to it so the SMB
knows when it has achieved the target) will be much more effective in achieving
truly diverse SMBs that represent the population of the state.
Of course, mandating diversity such as in Norway or California is much
more likely to be effective than suggesting a target and requiring an explanation
if the target is not hit. This is not the approach put forward for SMBs and, as we
have noted, this approach of mandates or quotas is likely to be resisted by some
and potentially raise constitutional concerns. 177 Moreover, it may be equally
ineffective if the consequences for failing to reach the mandate are not
significant enough. Forty percent female representation has been achieved in
Norway where the failure meant delisting. 178 The California statute requires a
significant fine of $100,000 for diversity non-compliance, 179 but the costs of
recruiting a new director or paying a new director who is added to the board to
meet the California mandate may be similar to the fine for non-compliance and,
therefore, not a sufficient consequence to compel compliance with the mandate.
The SEC’s first attempt at directing board diversity was to require boards to
disclose whether they considered diversity in the process of nominating new
boards. 180 This approach may have begun discussion in the boardroom about
gender diversity, but also invited companies to avoid the burdens of assessing
compliance with a diversity policy by not adopting one. 181 It is doubtful that a
requirement that SMBs describe how they considered diversity in selecting
board members would be any more successful.
There are many organizations actively working to increase corporate board
diversity, and many others, including institutional investors and proxy advisors,
are strongly advocating for increased diversity. 182 Notwithstanding these
resources, corporate boards are still far from mirroring the diversity of the
general population. 183 It might be important for SMB board diversity to be
championed outside of this project by other thought leaders, like the American
Medical Association or organizations of diverse medical professionals, so that
pressure to increase SMB diversity continues over time and is exerted on more
than one front.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See supra Section II.D.1.
DELOITTE, supra note 42, at 134.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3(e)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2021).
See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.
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Other approaches that have been successful in increasing corporate board
diversity have included convincing nominating committees to think about the
skills needed to be a successful board member and who might have those skills
other than the senior corporate leaders who usually feed the corporate board
pipeline. 184 We have heard anecdotally that legal disciplinary boards and SMBs
are also often staffed by senior members of the profession who may not be
representative of the state’s population. This concern prompts consideration of
how qualified board members are defined. In the case of the corporate
boardroom, qualified directors are now being sought from further down in the
corporate hierarchy, instead of exclusively from the C-suite. 185 Similarly,
younger legal or medical professionals might be more demographically diverse
than the more seasoned lawyers or doctors who might normally make up these
disciplinary boards. 186 Another alternative in the case of law and medical boards
would be to look to public, non-professional members to add gender, racial, and
ethnic diversity or to increase the number of public members appointed to the
disciplinary board with this goal of increasing diversity. 187
Broadening corporate board diversity may be easier in some respects than
broadening medical or legal disciplinary board diversity. Corporate board seats
are compensated and provide opportunities to be part of a group providing
oversight and guidance to a management team running a company. SMB and
lawyer disciplinary board participation may carry prestige and recognition from
professional peers, but likely does not offer the often lucrative compensation of
a corporate board seat. Moreover, the nature of the board work—sitting in
judgment of another professional and potentially imperiling his or her ability to
practice law or medicine—can be gut-wrenching and difficult, whereas
corporate board service, while time-consuming, is working with a team to
advance a company and increase value for its shareholders. So, it might be easier
to recruit diverse corporate board members than it will be to recruit diverse SMB
and lawyer disciplinary board members.
The SMB diversity proposal is a good start, but we believe it will be even
more effective if each board is required to publish their demographic targets,
along with an annual report on a standard form reporting the board’s diversity
compared to that target. Adding this disclosure requirement, as well as an
explanation whenever a diversity target is not achieved, would also be good
practice. Energizing external actors like medical professional associations to
184. See supra Section II.D.6.
185. Id.
186. Pendo et al., supra note 1, at 25; The Young Professional Workforce: 2017 Fact Sheet,
DEP’T FOR PRO. EMPS. 3 (2017), https://www.dpeaflcio.org/s/Young-Professionals-2017_FINALFormat-Update.pdf.
187. Heretick, supra note 151, at 6, 6–7; cf. Pendo et al., supra note 1, at 26 (The benefits of
diversity for SMBs may not be fully realized if “individuals appointed as public members also serve
as diverse members[.]”).
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support and advocate for SMB diversity efforts may also be helpful. Finally,
considering how to make SMB board service more attractive to potential
members may be warranted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although medical disciplinary boards differ in fundamental ways from the
boards of directors of for-profit corporations, there are similarities in the
governance goals and practices of companies and professions. It is thus not
surprising that almost of all of the arguments for board diversity raised in the
business literature or our own interviews also tend to support diversity on
disciplinary boards. Many of these arguments have also been recognized, at least
implicitly, by state bars and are embodied in the legal profession’s initiatives to
improve diversity in its disciplinary processes. Our research on corporate board
diversity, backed by the experience of the legal profession, suggests that medical
disciplinary boards should continue and strengthen their efforts to pursue
diversity.
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